Wei Chen worked at a coal power plant near Beijing for twenty-three years. Fifty-one years old. He’d watched the facility pump endless black smoke into the air while government officials visited annually to say “this is temporary.” Then in April 2025, Wei’s plant shut down. Not permanently—not yet. But permanently enough that his job title changed to “transition assistance specialist,” which meant he was being eased out while a nuclear construction crew was being brought in. “The change is remarkable,” Wei told. “We spent two decades burning coal because it was cheap and familiar. Now the government decided nuclear is the future. Not just for us. For everything.” He was right. On April 27, 2025, China’s State Council approved ten new nuclear reactors across five provinces—investment totaling 200 billion yuan ($27.4 billion). This was the fourth consecutive year China approved double-digit reactor counts. Typically, that would be a story about energy transition. But Wei understood something deeper. This wasn’t just about China changing its energy mix. This was about China deciding to become the nuclear company for the entire world. By 2035, China plans to operate 200 gigawatts of nuclear capacity. That’s 3.5x current capacity. That’s 150 new reactors. That’s roughly $370-440 billion in investment over ten years. But more important than the number is what comes next: once China builds that capacity, China will export the technology, export the reactors, export the supply chain. The global nuclear industry is about to be reorganized. And almost nobody outside China has noticed. But hold on—this isn’t actually about climate change at all. China’s nuclear strategy reveals something that Western governments don’t want to say out loud: nuclear isn’t competing with renewables for dominance. Nuclear is competing with coal for baseload power. And whoever controls nuclear supply chains controls energy security for every country on Earth. Understanding China’s actual move requires understanding three layers: what China is actually building, why it matters globally, and what happens to countries that don’t build their own. China’s Nuclear Acceleration isn’t Linear—It’s Strategic On the surface, China’s target looks straightforward: 200 GW by 2035. Currently at roughly 56-57 GW operational, with another 34+ GW under construction. So add 110 GW net from 2025-2035. That’s roughly 11 GW annually. The government is approving 10+ reactors annually. Each reactor averages 1.1-1.2 GW. Math checks out.​ But the real story is construction velocity. China has accelerated reactor completion times dramatically. Most Chinese reactors built since 2010 take 5-7 years from construction start to commercial operation. Compare that to the US (average 10+ years) or the UK (Hinkley Point C, 15+ years). Western reactors cost $35-63 billion for two units. Chinese reactors cost $2.7 billion per unit. That’s a 4-10x cost advantage.​ Why? Three factors: state-backed financing (People’s Bank of China provides favorable loans with 4.8% interest rates that Western banks won’t match), supply chain integration (China manufactures 70-80% of reactor components domestically), and regulatory streamlining (safety reviews take 18 months instead of 36+ months).​ So China isn’t just building more reactors. China is building them cheaper, faster, and with less friction. That combination is transformational. Here’s the strategic part: China approved only 2-3 reactors annually from 2011-2020. Then, in 2021, they jumped to 10+. Every year since 2022, they’ve approved 10+. This isn’t accident. This is deliberate policy acceleration synchronized with energy demand projections and carbon neutrality goals.​ Each approved reactor is a 5-7 year project. Approvals in 2025 mean operational reactors by 2030-2032. The government is front-loading approvals today to ensure pipeline flow through 2035.​ Why does this matter? Because China is building an industrial system, not just power plants. Fifteen different construction companies, dozens of component manufacturers, supply chain networks across ten provinces. Each reactor built teaches the supply chain how to build the next one faster. By reactor 100, construction time drops from 6 years to 4.5 years. By reactor 150, it approaches 4 years. That’s exponential productivity improvement.​ Why now? Why has China accelerated precisely this moment? Two forces converge: decarbonization deadline anxiety and technological sovereignty. First: China committed to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. That’s a hard deadline. Nuclear is the only technology that can provide dispatchable baseload power (unlike wind and solar) at zero carbon (unlike coal and gas). By 2035, China projects nuclear to generate 10% of electricity (up from current 5%). By 2060, nuclear needs to account for 18% of total generation, possibly 25% including heat and transport applications.​ That math only works if nuclear capacity triples by 2035 and roughly quadruples by 2050. There’s no flexibility. If China misses the 200 GW target in 2035, the 2060 net-zero goal becomes mathematically impossible. So nuclear acceleration isn’t aspirational. It’s mandatory to meet decarbonization commitments.​ Second: technological sovereignty. For the past three decades, China relied on Western nuclear technology. US AP1000 reactors, French designs, Canadian CANDU technology. But in the mid-2010s, China realized something dangerous: importing technology means depending on the technology provider. If Western countries decide nuclear cooperation is “national security sensitive,” they can cut off technology, spare parts, financing. China experienced this with semiconductors. They didn’t want to experience it with nuclear. So China developed the Hualong One (HPR1000) reactor domestically. It’s based on French designs (legitimately licensed and adapted), but all intellectual property belongs to China. By 2025, 41 Hualong One units are approved, under construction, or operational globally. Zero additional AP1000 reactors have been approved in China since 2018. Western technology got replaced, entirely.​ This is the inflection point. China has technological independence. Now China can scale. Approving 10+ reactors annually using domestically designed Hualong One reactors means the supply chain, the financing, the expertise—all stays inside China’s ecosystem.​ What this actually means in concrete numbers: By 2035, China will operate 200 GW of nuclear capacity. That’s equivalent to 120-150 large coal plants being retired. It’s roughly equivalent to 400 million tons of annual CO2 emissions avoided.​ But here’s the global impact: uranium demand. Each gigawatt of nuclear capacity requires roughly 500,000 pounds of uranium annually.​ So China’s 200 GW by 2035 means 100 million pounds of uranium annually. Current global uranium production is roughly 130-140 million pounds annually. China alone will consume 71-77% of current global production.​ That creates a supply crisis. Global uranium demand is projected to reach 220-280 million pounds by 2030, depending on whether other countries accelerate nuclear expansion (which they are—US, Europe, India, UAE all building reactors).​ Academic modeling shows a structural uranium shortage emerging by 2035 across all demand scenarios. Spot uranium prices have already rallied from $25/lb in 2020 to $82+ in 2025, with projections for $85-95 by end of 2025 as utilities front-load contracting.​ China currently imports 57% of global uranium by expenditure ($215+ million annually). But China also controls 60% of global uranium enrichment capacity (the processing step after mining). So China will control the entire back end of the fuel cycle. China mines/imports uranium, China enriches it, China sells refined fuel to other countries’ reactors. That’s energy infrastructure control.​ For nuclear power plants to operate globally, they depend on uranium supply and enrichment. Whoever controls enrichment controls nuclear expansion. China is positioned to control enrichment for the entire world.​ But here’s where the strategy reaches its actual goal: By 2035, China won’t just have 200 GW of domestic capacity. China will have exported Hualong One reactor designs and technology globally. Currently, Hualong One reactors are under construction or planned in: Pakistan (planned expansion): 2+ reactors Argentina: Atucha III (Hualong One licensed, $14+ billion Chinese financing) UK: Bradwell B (Hualong One, conditional design approval) Egypt: Study phase partnership with CNNC UAE, Turkey: Preliminary discussions That’s 5-10+ reactors before 2030 just from early partners.​ But the global pattern is clear. Countries without indigenous nuclear technology need to buy reactors. They can buy Western (expensive, slow, uncertain financing), Russian (geopolitically risky post-Ukraine), or Chinese (cheap, fast, state-backed financing). China is systematically positioning Hualong One as the standard-bearer technology for the Global South. Belt and Road countries get Chinese reactor loans at 4.8% interest. Western countries get market rates, lengthy regulatory processes, domestic political opposition.​ Over the next 15 years, if 30-50 new countries build reactors (as projected by the IAEA to meet climate commitments), and 70-80% of those use Chinese Hualong One technology, then China becomes the template. China becomes the supply chain. China becomes the industry standard.​ What the math actually shows: The winners: China secures energy independence. 200 GW nuclear + expanded renewables (China already leads in solar/wind manufacturing) + coal (being phased out but not eliminated) gives China complete control of its energy destiny. China depends on zero imported energy sources except uranium, which China can source from multiple suppliers (Kazakhstan, Canada, Uzbekistan, Namibia) or eventually extract from seawater (China’s developing that technology too).​ China gains massive geopolitical leverage. Countries that depend on Chinese reactor financing, Chinese technology, Chinese supply chains for nuclear fuel now depend on China for electricity. That’s not coercion. That’s just energy interdependency. But energy interdependency is how geopolitics works. Ask Europe what happens when you depend on Russian natural gas.​ Chinese manufacturers gain $370-440 billion in domestic contracts, then multiply that by exports. A Hualong One reactor costs $2.7 billion to build in China. If China exports 30-50 reactors over 15 years, that’s another $81-135 billion in export revenue. That’s real industrial capacity, real jobs, real technological expertise locked inside China’s ecosystem.​ The losers: Western countries lose technology market share in nuclear. US companies (Westinghouse, GE) who dominated global reactor exports from 1970-2010 haven’t approved a new domestic design since 2005. By 2030, the global reactor template will be Chinese Hualong One, not American. That’s permanent competitive loss.​ Countries dependent on Western nuclear suppliers (UK, France, etc.) become marginal. They can’t compete on cost, can’t compete on speed, can’t compete on financing. The UK’s Hinkley Point C ($63.7 billion for 2 reactors) will be obsolete by the time it’s completed. French nuclear export programs (once global leaders) are irrelevant against Chinese state-backed financing. Britain wanted to build its own reactor? France wanted to export technology? They’re now watching China execute exactly that strategy, faster and cheaper.​ Countries in the Global South get cheaper energy access but strategic dependence. A country building its first reactor with Chinese technology, Chinese financing, Chinese expertise now has little choice about its energy future. Nuclear plants operate for 60+ years. That’s a 60-year decision lock with China as the technology partner.​ Countries that refused nuclear expansion face energy constraints. If climate goals demand decarbonization and nuclear is the only baseload option, then countries that rejected nuclear in the past (Germany, Denmark) now face harder carbon reduction challenges using only renewables. By 2030, when the renewable-only path becomes mathematically infeasible, those countries will need nuclear. They’ll be buying Chinese reactors anyway.​ But here’s what actually matters—the trade-off nobody’s discussing publicly: China is building a nuclear power future that looks like it’s about climate change, but it’s actually about industrial control. The stated goal is decarbonization. China’s 200 GW by 2035 would reduce CO2 emissions by 920 million tons annually (roughly 8% of China’s total emissions). But China’s total coal capacity is still 1,200+ GW. Even after nuclear reaches 200 GW, coal remains 60%+ of baseload supply.​ So nuclear expansion doesn’t eliminate coal. Nuclear supplements coal as baseload. The real function is energy security: China builds nuclear capacity so it doesn’t depend entirely on imported coal (or imported energy sources). It’s insurance against supply disruptions, trade wars, energy embargoes. But there’s a second function: supply chain control. By mastering nuclear construction (cheap, fast, standardized), China creates a replicable model for global exports. Other countries see: China builds reactors 50% faster and 50% cheaper than Western countries. Who would choose Western? So by 2035, when 100+ countries are making nuclear decisions to meet climate commitments, China has captured the template. That’s not energy cooperation. That’s technological hegemony through standardization. There’s also the waste problem. Nuclear generates 12,000+ tons of high-level waste annually per GW of capacity. …

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